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Three Degrees of Promising 
Eric G. Andersen∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A young married man borrowed a substantial sum of money. He was 
already making mortgage payments on his house. After a time he found 
himself unable to make both the installment payments on the loan and 
the mortgage payments on the house. He concluded that he must either 
default on the loan and file for bankruptcy or sell his house and rent a 
small apartment. He sought advice.1 
One friend advised: “You have a legal obligation to repay the 
amount you borrowed, but your creditor, by agreeing to make you an 
unsecured loan, voluntarily accepted a risk that you might be unable to 
repay. That was a business decision your creditor made. The interest rate 
it charges for its loans assumes a certain rate of default among its 
debtors. You are legally entitled to the protection of the law of 
bankruptcy, which will allow you to keep your house. You should do so 
without any sense of shame.”2 
Another friend advised: “Keep your agreement and repay the loan.”3 
 
∗ Eric G. Anderson is a professor of Law and Associate Academic Dean, University of Iowa 
College of Law. He greatly appreciates the encouragement and constructive criticism of Catherine 
H. Andersen, Stephanos Bibas, Margaret F. Brinig, Ann Laquer Estin, John D. Peters, H. Jefferson 
Powell, and John-Mark Stensvaag. Gina Cesaretti provided valuable research assistance. 
This article is an expanded version of a presentation made at the Latter-day Saint Perspectives 
on Law Symposium held at Brigham Young University on October 19, 2001. 
 1. Based on N. Eldon Tanner, Address at the 136th Semi-Annual General Conference of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Oct. 1, 1966), in OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE 136TH SEMI-
ANNUAL GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 97, 99 
(1996); see also Keep Your Covenants, IMPROVEMENT ERA, Dec. 1996, at 1136–37. 
 2. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 778–80 
(1987) (“A contract is not a legally enforceable obligation to do a promised thing. . . . A bankruptcy 
scholar would point out that . . . a contract requires [only that] a party . . . do the thing promised 
or . . . pay the money equivalent or . . . discharge the promise through the bankruptcy system. . . . 
Anyone who ever extends credit faces the possibility that repayment will not be forthcoming. 
Interest is structured, among other things, to pay the creditor for assuming the risk of nonpayment.”). 
For a discussion of bankruptcy in terms of the community’s moral obligation to provide insolvent 
debtors with a fresh start, see Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for 
Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (1991). 
 3. See Tanner, supra note 1, at 99. 
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“Even if it costs me my home?” asked the young man.4 “I am not talking 
about your home,” the friend replied, “I am talking about your 
agreement, and I think your wife would rather have a husband who 
would keep his word, meet his obligations, keep his pledges or his 
covenants, and have to rent a home than have a home with a husband 
who will not keep his covenants and his pledges.”5 
The two friends approached the meaning of the young man’s 
promise in very different ways. The first viewed it in legal and economic 
terms, casting it in terms of business risk and legal options. The second 
saw the promise in moral, even spiritual, terms, associating it with the 
young man’s integrity and, using the words “covenant” and “pledge,” 
linking the promise with the expectations the young man’s wife might 
have of his character. 
The advice the young man received suggests that widely varying 
ideas about the meaning and importance of promises are current in our 
culture. This paper does not point to a simple or authoritative resolution 
of the young man’s dilemma, but I hope it might be useful to those 
facing such questions. 
When lawyers think of promises, they usually think of contracts. 
Scholars debate the precise importance of promises to contracts, but 
promises are clearly at the heart of mainstream thinking about contracts. 
The modern law of contracts centers its attention on commercial 
transactions, although it is also prepared to deal with noncommercial 
relationships, such as charitable subscriptions and undertakings between 
family members. Such noncommercial transactions can influence the 
formation of contract law.6 But the content and structure of the law is 
devised primarily to govern dealings in the commercial world. 
If promises are central to the world of commercial contracts, is it also 
fair to say that contracts are central to the world of promises? One might 
be tempted to think so. There are, however, settings in which people 
make promises that the law considers important but that contract law 
fails to address carefully or at all. 
Consider making a promise under oath. When the President-elect 
stands before the Chief Justice of the United States on inauguration day 
or when an anonymous person from small-town America is sworn in as a 
witness in a trial, each makes a promise accompanied by some degree of 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 92–93 (3d ed. 1999). 
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ritual intended to impress upon all participants in the occasion that a 
serious obligation has been undertaken. Contracts casebooks and 
treatises do not address these promises, although books on government 
and the law of evidence may do so. 
Consider marriage. When a bride and groom approach the altar in a 
traditional religious ceremony or stand before a justice of the peace in a 
purely secular proceeding at town hall, part of what they do is make 
promises to each other. Whatever else their promises might mean, they 
have an important legal effect. Those promises, however, are not the 
subject of contract law. Although formal contracts may be made in 
connection with the formation or dissolution of a marriage, the marriage 
vows themselves are more accurately described as creating an important 
legal status, a subject usually classified as part of family law. 
The practice of promising, even if one focuses only on promises that 
have legal significance, touches us at many points in our lives. The 
formal law of contracts addresses only some of them, with other bodies 
of law pressed into service to deal with the rest. The result is that lawyers 
look at promise-making in a fragmented way. 
As a practical matter, no harm exists in doing so. A single body of 
law need not deal adequately with both the sale of tractor parts and the 
creation of a family through the exchange of marriage vows. But the act 
of promising is central in both cases. Looking for relationships between 
the different kinds of promises we make in disparate settings is a 
worthwhile exercise. Specifically, in keeping with the theme of the 
symposium of which this essay is a part, I suggest that the variety of 
promises we make reflects the tension between the self-serving, 
“natural”7 side and the spiritual, “eternal” side of human nature as 
understood by members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (“Latter-day Saints” or the “LDS Church”). 
I make that point by dividing promises into three loose categories or 
“degrees.” Latter-day Saints will recognize the allusion to the “three 
degrees of glory”8 which, in a very general sense, correspond to my three 
degrees of promising. I conceive of the degrees of promising as areas 
along a spectrum ranging from our natural to our eternal selves. Ordinary 
 
 7. A common Latter-day Saint term is “natural man.” See Mosiah 3:19 (Book of Mormon); 
Alma 41:11 (Book of Mormon); Neal A. Maxwell, Put Off the Natural Man, and Come off 
Conqueror, ENSIGN, Nov. 1990, at 14–16 (“the burdensome natural man . . . is naturally selfish”). 
 8. Latter-day Saints believe that a range of eternal circumstances, grouped under three main 
heads, awaits God’s children after mortality. See Doctrine & Covenants 76:50–113; 88:14–31; see 
also 1 Corinthians 15:40–44 (King James); 2 Corinthians 12:2 (King James). 
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commercial agreements reside at the natural end of the spectrum. They 
assume the contracting parties will seek their own economic self-
interests, with relatively minimal oversight by the sovereign state. 
Towards the middle of the spectrum are promises illustrated by 
commitments made under oath and typical marriage vows. Such 
promises assume one acting not solely or even primarily in self-interest, 
but in the interests of others and the larger community, with the 
sovereign state playing a more active, if ceremonial, role when the 
promise is made. Promises of the third degree, illustrated by religious 
covenants, assume the promisor acts as a spiritual or eternal being, with 
sovereign God in a close and vital relationship as promisee and 
reciprocating promisor. 
The “natural” and “eternal” sides of our natures influence the way 
we think about the promises we make. Although first- and third-degree 
promises reside close to their respective ends of the spectrum, each is 
nevertheless subject to the influence of the opposite pole. Second-degree 
promising is in approximate equipoise between the two. In this essay, I 
suggest that society’s view of promises in that middle region may reveal 
something important about how we collectively value the natural and 
eternal sides of our natures. 
II. THE FIRST DEGREE OF PROMISING 
The first degree of promising is represented by the traditional law of 
contracts, especially as applied to ordinary commercial contracts. In 
recent decades, contract law has seen substantial development in the 
courts and legislatures and has received extensive attention in the 
academic literature. Notwithstanding the complexity of that development 
and of the theories used to explain it, I maintain that the law of contracts, 
as reflected in our commercial and personal lives, assumes that 
promisors are principally motivated by self-interest, which interest is 
measured in material terms. The promisor is thus a “natural” or (to use a 
more modern phrase) economic being. First-degree promising also 
assumes that the governmental sovereign plays a largely passive role, at 
least at the level of individual bargains. 
A. Contracts and the Economic Being 
Recent generations of legal scholars have developed a number of 
impressive and complex theories to explain and prescribe the content of 
modern contract law. Some of them would no doubt take exception to 
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my simple and categorical statement about an economic being as the 
assumed actor in the practice of making, performing, and enforcing 
contracts. I do not mean that contract law and theory can be accounted 
for solely in economic terms. I suggest, however, that contract law and 
theory cannot be explained without those terms. Conceiving of 
contracting parties as economic actors is an essential part of the 
conceptual infrastructure of contract law. Reference to a few current and 
important approaches to contract theory illustrates the point. 
The most obvious example is the school of thought that views the 
law of contracts primarily as an engine for achieving economic 
efficiency, meaning an increase in total “utility” in society.9 Efficiency 
results when two individuals exchange assets because each values the 
other’s asset more highly than his or her own.10 The parties to such an 
exchange usually choose to plan their transactions in advance rather than 
engage in a sale on the spot, so they trade promises to perform in the 
future. Such bargained-for exchanges of promises are at the heart of 
modern contract practice. From the law and economics perspective, the 
purpose of the law of contracts is to foster the bargaining process 
between economically rational actors, thus moving goods and services to 
their most highly valued uses and increasing the sum of utility in society 
as a whole. 
The economic analysis is highly sophisticated.11 However 
sophisticated the analysis, though, economic efficiency is always at the 
bottom. As noted by Professor Alan Schwartz, the state should pursue 
efficiency in contract law because efficiency is the only implementable 
goal.12 Clearly, an economic being—a self-interested individual whose 
interests are measured in economic terms—is at the heart of this 
approach to contract law. 
 
 9. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACT LAW 3–7 (1979). 
 10. The classic example of an efficient transaction is the simple exchange of goods for 
money. I have a book and you have $10.00. I would rather have $10.00 than the book, and you 
would rather have the book than $10.00. If we bargain for and carry out an exchange of our assets, 
each of us is better off, and the total quantum of utility in society has increased. 
 11. For example, it looks beyond simple assumptions about the circumstances that will exist 
if a promise is performed or enforced as made. As Richard Craswell has pointed out, theorists 
recognize that they must take account of the effects of enforceability on the economic incentives to 
make promises in the first place. See Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing 
Promises, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 26–34 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). 
 12. See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 18 (Jody S. Krause & 
Steven D. Walt eds., 2000). 
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Not all theories of contract law center on giving effect to the 
utilitarian preferences revealed by the bargaining process. One important 
approach to contract theory, for example, focuses on the autonomy of the 
promisor.13 The underlying idea is that making a commitment in the 
form of a promise is an exercise of individual autonomy and the law 
respects that autonomy by holding the promisor to the self-imposed 
obligation. Since contracts, by definition, include the making of a 
promise, a “contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.”14 
On its face, an autonomy theory of contract would appear to be 
grounded in a moral theory of respecting individual choice and 
commitment that is not necessarily connected with the economic sphere. 
A difficulty with this class of contract theory, however, as Professor 
Melvin A. Eisenberg has recently noted, is that if truly based solely on 
the value of respecting individual autonomy, the theory can neither 
account for the existing rules of contract law nor generate satisfactory 
rules.15 
For example, the principle of mitigating damages, central to existing 
contract doctrine and policy, holds an injured promisee accountable to 
avoid unnecessary costs or consequences for the party committing a 
breach.16 One reason courts do not routinely order specific performance 
is that doing so would often be inconsistent with the mitigation 
principle.17 Requiring promisors to follow through with promises they 
have failed to perform would, if feasible at all, often impose serious costs 
on them with no corresponding benefit to promisees. So the law turns 
instead to money damages, which are adjusted according to the 
mitigation principle. If giving effect to the autonomy of the promisor 
were to trump all other values, however, then specific performance 
would become a routine remedy. 
Similarly, revising contract doctrine to be consistent with a single-
minded autonomy theory of contract would lead to undesirable results. 
As Professor Eisenberg notes, such a theory would require the legal 
 
 13. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 
(1986). 
 14. FRIED, supra note 13, at 17. 
 15. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
(Peter Benson ed., 2001). 
 16. See Eric G. Andersen, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contracts, 21 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1092 (1988); Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 
73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 306 (1988). 
 17. See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 228–29. 
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enforcement of purely donative promises, such as promises between 
friends to make gifts.18 But doing so would thrust the personal 
relationships fostered by gift-giving into the world of lawyers and 
lawsuits. The parties to such promises do not intend to be legally bound 
(even if they consider themselves morally bound) because they know that 
their relationship, “driven by affective considerations like love, affection, 
friendship, gratitude, and comradeship” is inconsistent with that world. 19 
Professor Eisenberg’s own careful and nuanced approach to contract 
theory illustrates why the economic being always appears center stage: 
any workable body of contract law will be tethered to economic 
concepts, even when it accounts for “relevant moral, policy, and 
empirical propositions.”20 For example, he identifies “social welfare” as 
an important moral or policy element relevant to whether a promise 
should be enforceable.21 He then describes social welfare in terms of 
“increase[d] wealth by trade and [the facilitation of] private economic 
planning [that allows] actors to allocate risks and to coordinate economic 
activity through the acquisition of control over inputs and outputs.”22 
Moreover, protecting reasonable reliance on promises also advances 
social welfare “because the promise induced the promisee to incur costs 
he would not otherwise have incurred.”23 Thus, social welfare is 
characterized in terms of economic costs and benefits. 
The integral link between contract law and the economic realm is 
illustrated by the nature of contract remedies, broadly considered. 
Remedies are relevant because, as Professor Stephen A. Smith noted 
recently, “We should assume that an account of the interests protected by 
contractual remedies has something important to say about the interests 
protected by contract law generally.” 24 Whatever bases for enforcing 
promises may be advanced, the consequences of breach are not only 
measured, but conceived in economic terms.25 
 
 18. Id. at 229–30. 
 19. Id. at 230. 
 20. Id. at 241. 
 21. Id. at 261. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Stephen A. Smith, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages and the Morality of 
Contract Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, June 2001, at 4. 
 25. Of course, the subject of remedies for breach of contract is highly complex with different 
basic measures of damages, which are calculated on a number of different bases, available in various 
situations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT 
SECOND]. 
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B. The Role of the Sovereign 
The sovereign state plays a complex role in first-degree promising. 
At one level the state is deeply enmeshed in every agreement. At another 
level the state is largely passive, leaving the parties to make their own 
bargains and intervening only in exceptional circumstances. 
The state’s deep involvement is found in the background of law and 
policy against which individual bargains are made. To the extent the state 
controls the distribution of wealth in society, it necessarily affects the 
economic bargaining power of those who make promises to exchange 
assets with one another. Whether by legislative action or common law, 
the state also puts in place a set of rules and practices—a legal 
infrastructure within which bargaining occurs. Some rules are 
mandatory, such as those regarding capacity to contract.26 Others are 
“default rules” that the parties can change by agreement.27 
Much of the infrastructure set up by the state aims to protect against 
abuses of the bargaining process. Doctrines of fraud, duress, and 
unconscionability are examples of such safeguards. The infrastructure 
also reflects the distribution of political power in society, however, 
sometimes in ways that are so common they have become invisible.28 
When one leaves the level of infrastructure and deals with individual 
bargains, the sovereign’s role becomes decidedly passive. Under both 
efficiency and autonomy theories, it is, by definition, up to the parties to 
make their own bargains. The sovereign acts essentially as a referee by 
authorizing contract formation and enforcing contracts as made. Except 
in extraordinary cases, such as large mergers that threaten the national 
economy, the state stays out of the process of individual contract 
formation, becoming involved only when the parties themselves reach an 
impasse and one of them seeks to enforce or avoid a contractual 
obligation. 
“The world of contract is a market world, largely driven by relatively 
 
 26. See id. § 12. 
 27. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2–308 (2002) (specifying the place of delivery of good in a contract 
for sale in the absence of agreement to the contrary). 
 28. For example, if an agreement does not specify an order of performance, a promise that 
takes time to perform must be completed before one that can be performed instantaneously. See 
RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 25, § 234. Thus, as a practical matter, those who perform labor 
in exchange for money must work first and be paid later. It would be just as logical to require an 
employer to pay in advance. The default rule reflects the typical bargaining advantages that 
employers often enjoy over employees, although nothing prevents an agreement altering the rule. 
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impersonal considerations, and focused on commodities and prices.”29 
Moral obligation may be a component of admirable and workable 
academic theories of contracts. Moreover, practical contract law, which 
often operates with cheerful oblivion to academic theories, contains 
many doctrines, such as illegality, the avoidance of forfeiture, refusal to 
enforce on grounds of public policy, unconscionability, and (in some 
conceptions) contractual good faith, that rest on more than economic 
grounds alone.30 But neither the theories nor the law in practice can 
operate successfully in the real world if they do not measure the value of 
a promise and the costs of enforcement in terms of their economic value 
to the contracting parties. The economic being, under the not-so-watchful 
eye of the sovereign state, employs contracts to acquire and consume. 
This observation is not intended as a critique of modern contract law 
and theory, which is another subject altogether. My point is simply that 
the legal system that governs promising in the daily world of commerce, 
work, and leisure, and the theories we employ to explain and shape that 
system, focus heavily, even primarily, on self interest, framed in terms of 
economic values. Those values represent, in large part, the common 
currency of our modern, secular society. 
III. THE SECOND DEGREE OF PROMISING 
Second-degree promising is common in American culture, although 
it is seldom the subject of articles and treatises on the law of contracts. 
Such promising occurs in contexts that have legal significance but are 
not understood as being primarily economic in nature. I offer two 
examples: promises made under oath and marriage vows. Each involves 
promises made on the basis of one’s membership in a community, 
whether it be a family or the larger society to which we belong. These 
promises implicitly assume that the promisor acts not as an economic 
being but as a moral being.31 
 
 29. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 229–30. 
 30. See infra Part V.A (noting that the economic being is not fully dominant, even in first-
degree promising). 
 31. These examples are certainly not exhaustive of second-degree promises. Undoubtedly 
many other promises, including purely donative promises, fall within this category. Nevertheless, 
something more than the fact of the promise is needed to signal a serious moral obligation of the 
kind discussed here. For example, a fundamental difference exists between a promise to get together 
for lunch sometime and a promise to care for a friend’s dying husband or wife. I focus here on two 
kinds of promises in which the presence of a serious moral obligation is universally recognized. 
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A. Promises Made Under Oath 
In American culture, making oaths appears calculated to enhance the 
virtues important to a cohesive, civil society. The oath is usually made in 
a formal setting, often in circumstances designed to lend dignity to the 
occasion. A person making a promise under oath usually engages in 
some form of ritual, such as raising the right hand. The formality of the 
setting and the element of ritual impress on the minds of those present—
both the oath taker and others—that something important is happening.32 
An oath and a promise are not the same thing. An oath is a solemn 
attestation of the truth of one’s statement. Traditionally, an oath invokes 
Deity, appealing to God to witness the giving of the statement.33 
Sometimes the oath invites divine punishment if the statement is false. In 
modern times, an oath may not be consciously associated with divinity, 
but it emphasizes the earnestness and seriousness with which the 
statement is made. 
The statement itself may be an assertion of a present fact, such as 
one’s loyalty to country, or it may be a promise, a commitment to act (or 
not act) in a certain way in the future. Oaths often reinforce the making 
of a promise. Important examples include a promise to speak truthfully in 
judicial proceedings and a commitment to faithfully perform the duties of 
public office. 
The state as sovereign takes a much more active role in promises of 
this sort than in first-degree promising. In some cases, the state actually 
imposes the duty to make the promise in the first place, as when one is 
summoned to court and instructed to promise under oath to judge 
honestly as a juror or to speak truthfully as a witness at a trial. The 
sovereign’s participation in the making of the promise is generally 
required. For instance, a government official administers the oath of 
office to a public servant, and an officer of the court leads a witness 
through the oath to testify truthfully. 
The notion of economic gain is not intrinsic to the making of 
promises under oaths. An oath may be part of a bargain,34 of course, but 
the transaction is not typically commercial in character. Instead, the oath 
 
 32. See FED. R. EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that 
the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken 
the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with the duty to do so.”) (emphasis added). 
 33. See infra Part IV.B.1 (further discussing oaths). 
 34. A defendant in a criminal case, for example, may plead to a lesser offense in exchange 
for his or her promise to testify under oath against others. 
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taker makes a commitment to benefit the broader community, as by 
promising to speak truthfully in a judicial proceeding, even at the cost of 
personal discomfort or even danger. 
Failure to keep a promise made under oath brings consequences 
different from those of breaching a commercial, first-degree promise. As 
noted, the latter authorizes remedies measured in economic terms. By 
contrast, violation of a promise made under oath might lead to a criminal 
penalty, a judicial sanction, impeachment, or public opprobrium. Such 
penalties do not attempt to measure the economic value of keeping the 
promise or of the harm done by not keeping it but rather respond to the 
societal harm caused by the breach. 
B. Marriage 
Marriage vows, another kind of second-degree promising, are made 
in a very different setting from the typical public oath. But the 
commitments made at marriage have key elements in common with 
promises made under oath. They encompass an important promise made 
in an often elaborate ceremony. 
The role of the sovereign state, again, is very much an evidentiary 
one. The law requires officiation by a third person authorized by the 
state.35 In many instances, that person is also a religious authority whose 
presence suggests that another sovereign is represented.36 
The law says very little about the form of the marriage vow. It leaves 
the precise words spoken and ceremony followed to traditions of the 
parties’ community or, increasingly, to their individual choice.37 The 
content of the promises made at marriage, however, is indirectly 
prescribed and enforced by the law. The parties accept the bundle of 
rights and responsibilities that constitute the legal status of marriage. The 
law traditionally has had little to say about the details of those rights and 
obligations while the marriage lasts. Until fairly recently, it generally 
presumed that the husband spoke for the family, and the law refused to 
become involved in resolving disputes over family management issues.38 
Upon entering marriage the parties promise (or are assumed to 
 
 35. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.10 (West 2001); CAL. FAM. CODE § 400 (West 1994 & 
Supp. 2002). 
 36. See infra Part IV (discussing religious third-degree promising). 
 37. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 2.3 (2d ed. 1988). 
 38. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1959); McGuire v. McGuire, 59 
N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953). 
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promise) to provide for one another’s physical, economic, social, and 
spiritual needs during their marriage. But the law has left the definition 
of those needs, and the understanding of how they are to be met, to the 
parties themselves. 39 The law has traditionally marked the point at which 
a spouse’s performance of marital obligations drops below a minimum 
by setting the requirements for divorce. The fault-based grounds that 
once governed marriage dissolution described the kinds of misconduct 
that warranted releasing a spouse from the promises made upon entering 
marriage.40 
The law changed substantially when no-fault divorce statutes 
supplemented or replaced fault-based divorce beginning in the late 
1960s.41 As those statutes have been interpreted, a spouse has been 
effectively able to determine unilaterally that the marriage has failed and 
will end.42 
This paper is not an occasion to explore the current state of marriage 
and divorce law. The point is that marriage, like promises made under 
oath, represents a kind of promising quite different from the commercial 
transactions that typify first-degree promising. Although marriage and 
divorce have important economic implications, those institutions are 
generally, and correctly, understood to be about far more than 
economics. Most people assume that individuals enter a marriage 
expecting to be made better off by it, but the public understanding of 
marriage has been that it represents something greater than a self-serving 
bargain. Rather, it is a life-long commitment, in which love, selflessness, 
and sacrifice are expected for the good of others, including both 
immediate family and the larger community. 
In our culture, neither marriage nor formal oaths can be properly 
understood without considering what I define as third-degree promising. 
 
 39. The law has occasionally intruded into the economic decision-making of a legally intact 
family via the necessaries doctrine. See, e.g., Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219 
(Wis. 1980). In recent years it has also become more attentive to domestic abuse, although that 
problem exists in nonmarital as well as marital relationships. See, e.g., 1 FAMILY LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 6.02[1] (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2002). 
 40. See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 12 
(1968); 1 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, § 4.03. 
 41. See CLARK, supra note 37, § 13.6. 
 42. See id. at 516 (“[I]f one of the spouses seriously and persistently asserts that the marriage 
is broken, it is broken, notwithstanding the disagreement of the other spouse and notwithstanding the 
other spouse’s insistence that the marriage could be saved.”); James Herbie Difonzo, Customized 
Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 905–06 (2000); see also Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as 
Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 
719, 722–23. 
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I turn now to that idea. 
IV. THE THIRD DEGREE OF PROMISING 
Third-degree promising occurs when one makes religious covenants 
with God. A summary of my conclusions about first and second-degree 
promises illuminate the idea of third-degree promising. 
First-degree promising assumes a self-interested promisor primarily 
seeking material advantage through bargaining with others. The 
sovereign plays a limited role, establishing the ground rules and 
enforcing the agreement through economically-conceived remedies. 
Otherwise the sovereign lets the chips fall where they may as to the 
outcome of the bargaining itself. 
Second-degree promising assumes a promisor acting primarily as a 
person exercising moral choice. The rules and practices governing such 
promising are designed to impress upon the promisor and those 
witnessing the promise that it is not made solely for personal advantage, 
but for the benefit of the broader community. The sovereign plays an 
active role including officiating when the promise is made so as to 
emphasize the moral obligation it involves. 
By contrast, third-degree promising treats a promisor primarily as a 
spiritual and (in LDS theology) an eternal being who stands in a 
relationship with God. Third-degree promises, like those of the second 
degree, are not made primarily in the pursuit of personal advantage, but 
for the benefit of others, whether a specific individual, a family, or even 
an entire religious community. The promise may be made either to God, 
to other persons, or both. Whether or not God is the promisee on behalf 
of a community, the promisor invokes the relationship with God, as 
sovereign, without whom the promise could not be efficacious. Divine 
law and justice provide the framework for the promise and define the 
consequences of breach. 
A. Religious Covenants 
The clearest illustrations of third-degree promises are those made by 
believers within their own religious communities. Consistent with the 
focus of this symposium—Latter-day Saint Perspectives on Law—I 
illustrate with examples from my own religion. Members of other 
religious communities will doubtless recognize parallels in their own 
beliefs. 
Latter-day Saints usually refer to their third-degree promises as 
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“covenants,” a word reinforcing a sense of their solemnity and 
seriousness.43 One making a covenant participates in a sacred ceremony, 
presided over by one with authority to act on behalf of God.44 
Baptism into the LDS church, for example, includes making a 
covenant with God that the new member “will serve him and keep his 
commandments.”45 Baptism requires the performance of a sacred 
ceremony—immersion in water. One can renew the baptismal covenant 
by taking the sacrament—bread and water reminding the individual of 
the body and blood of Christ.46 
One of the most important religious experiences available to a 
Latter-day Saint is participation in the ordinances of the temple, an 
exceptionally sacred place considered to be the “House of the Lord.”47 In 
the temple, worthy members of the LDS church make sacred covenants 
to draw closer to God. These covenants involve dignified ceremonies and 
are officiated over by church leaders with special authority. Gordon B. 
Hinckley, the current President of the LDS church, has referred to these 
covenants as “act[s] of solemn promising.”48 
One of the covenants an individual makes in the temple is the 
covenant of marriage, in which the spouses make promises not only to 
each other, but also to God.49 If the husband and wife fulfill their part of 
the marriage covenant, their bond to each other and to their children 
remains effective beyond death and through eternity. 
Even this very brief description makes clear that these covenants 
 
 43. The concept of the oath is sometimes used together with covenant. Doctrine & Covenants 
84:39. For further reading on the Church’s beliefs regarding covenants, see Wouter Van Beek, 
Covenants, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 331–33 (Daniel H. Ludlow et al. eds., 1992); 
George S. Tate, Covenants in Biblical Times, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, 333–35; BRUCE 
R. MCCONKIE, MORMON DOCTRINE 166–68 (2d ed. 1966); James E. Faust, Search Me, O God, and 
Know My Heart, ENSIGN, May 1998, at 17–20; Richard K. Hart, The Marriage Metaphor, ENSIGN, 
Jan. 1995, at 22–27; Robert J. Matthews, Our Covenants With the Lord, ENSIGN, Dec. 1980, at 33–
39; Lynn D. Wardle, Seeing the Constitution as Covenant, ENSIGN, Sept. 1989, at 7–9. 
 44. Dennis B. Neuenschwander, Ordinances and Covenants, ENSIGN, Aug. 2001, at 20. 
 45. Mosiah 18:10 (Book of Mormon). 
 46. Those partaking of the sacrament, speaking to God through one with the authority to 
administer the ordinance of the sacrament, “witness . . . that they are willing to take upon them the 
name of [the] Son, and always remember him and keep his commandments which he has given 
them.” Doctrine & Covenants 20:77. In return, God promises those who make that promise that 
“they may always have his Spirit to be with them.” Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Boyd K. Packer, The Holy Temple, ENSIGN, Feb. 1995, at 32; John A. Widtsoe, 
Looking Toward the Temple, ENSIGN, Jan. 1972, at 56. 
 48. TEACHINGS OF GORDON B. HINCKLEY 638 (1997). 
 49. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 43; Marion D. Hanks, Eternal Marriage, ENSIGN, Nov. 1984, 
at 35. 
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represent commitments of a different order than first-degree promises in 
commercial contracts or second-degree promises illustrated by promises 
under oath and civil marriage vows. Third-degree promises, made by a 
person acting as a spiritual, eternal being, are distinct from the law of the 
land. Except for the covenant of marriage, which is legally as well as 
religiously binding (in the United States, but not in all other countries), 
the covenants I have described do not create legal rights and duties. They 
operate in a different sphere. Those who fulfill their part of the covenants 
can hope for the fulfillment of God’s promises in this life and the next. 
This assurance of eternal efficacy is underscored by LDS scripture that 
states the principle in the negative: 
All covenants, contracts, bonds, obligations, oaths, vows, 
performances, connections, associations, or expectations, that are not 
made and entered into and sealed by the Holy Spirit of promise, of him 
who is anointed, both as well for time and for all eternity, . . . are of no 
efficacy, virtue, or force in and after the resurrection from the dead; for 
all contracts that are not made unto this end have an end when men are 
dead. . . . And everything that is in the world, whether it be ordained of 
men, by thrones, or principalities, or powers, or things of name, 
whatsoever they may be, that are not by me or by my word, saith the 
Lord, shall be thrown down, and shall not remain after men are dead, 
neither in nor after the resurrection.50 
The clear implication is that third-degree “covenants, contracts, 
bonds, obligations, [and] oaths” will endure “in [and] after the 
resurrection.” 
B. A Second Look at Promises under Oath and Marriage 
Third-degree promising prospers most in a setting in which believers 
can freely and fully express and act on their religious convictions. But 
such promising may not be limited to religious covenants associated with 
specific religious communities. A look beneath the surface of the second-
degree promising previously discussed—making promises under oath 
and exchanging marriage vows51—shows that in its purest or ideal sense 
such second-degree promising may be more closely related to third-
degree promising than first appears. 
My sketch of second-degree promising presented an overly tidy 
picture: Men and women undertake commitments to behave in a certain 
 
 50. Doctrine & Covenants 132:7, :13. 
 51. See supra Part III. 
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way, recognizing that society has a strong interest in their promises 
beyond whatever personal benefit or disadvantage may flow to them. 
They understand that they are making solemn, voluntary undertakings as 
free, moral agents. Although they may often fall short in honoring their 
commitments, in making and keeping promises of this sort they are 
expected to act, or to aspire to act, on moral principle. 
Second-degree promising is not so simple, however. Both of the 
examples discussed in this paper are closely bound up with religion. 
Whether or not the promisor intends a religious element in the 
commitment, I suggest that a religious connection remains important to 
these institutions of second-degree promising. In a legal culture 
committed to the separation of church and state, and one increasingly 
uncomfortable with allowing religion a role in the public square, we have 
filtered out many of the explicit references to Deity in these promises.52 
Instead, we tend to think of them primarily as, and in many respects they 
have become, exercises in moral agency. I suggest, however, that their 
religious character cannot be so easily excised. The practices of making 
oaths and entering marriage has traditionally directly implicated an 
individual’s relationship to Deity. The promisor makes a solemn 
affirmation, not simply as a man or woman who wishes or needs to be 
taken seriously in a cause greater than self-interest, but as one who 
stands in a relationship to God. 
1. The religious underpinnings of the modern oath 
The history of the oath makes its religious underpinnings particularly 
clear. In various ancient cultures, the oath-taker invoked Deity and 
engaged in some form of imprecation—inviting liability to divine 
punishment or vengeance if the promise or assertion proves to be false.53 
The dramatic imprecation, a conditional self-curse, has captured the 
attention of some who study the oath and has been portrayed, sometimes 
critically, as its essential element, even in modern times.54 I find it more 
reasonable to see the oathtaker’s acknowledgment of God as the oath’s 
 
 52. For example, the statutorily specified oath administered in California courts used to 
include the words “so help you God.” The statute now provides a variety of forms of “oath, 
affirmation, or declaration” with several options eliminating that phrase. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 2094 (West 1998 & Supp. 2002). Similarly, the oath administered to grand jurors has been revised 
to eliminate the words “so help me God.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002). 
 53. See Helen Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1339–43 (1959). 
 54. Id. at 1329 (“This presentation is an attempt at showing that the oath has remained an 
atavistic survival of an ancient ritual—a primitive self-curse.”). 
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essential element. However common the imprecatory element may have 
been in some settings, it would have no purpose if not grounded in a 
belief in the divine, or at least the supernatural, in the first place. 
The nature of the oath taker’s relationship to Deity necessarily has a 
great deal to do with the meaning of the oath itself. Invoking the 
attention of a god one believed to be capricious or cruel would be a 
different thing than an oath made before a god who is understood to be 
just and merciful. From his obviously Christian perspective, James 
Endell Tyler therefore described the essence of the oath as a “pledge[] 
that [one] is speaking under a solemn sense of the presence of Deity, the 
witness of our words and actions, the moral Governor of the world, the 
Judge of mankind, and the just avenger of falsehood and wrong.”55 That 
“solemn sense” gives peculiar power to a promise made under oath.56 
Modern oaths often omit explicitly religious elements, but the 
shadow of those elements remains. The evidence is conflicting about 
whether the framers intended constitutionally mandated oaths as 
religious versus solemn, though secular, promises⎯i.e., as second versus 
first-degree promises.57 
Those taking oaths of office have voluntarily added religious 
elements to their oaths. George Washington added the words “so help me 
God” to the oath he took as the nation’s first President, an addition that 
has persisted as a custom even though that phrase is not included in the 
constitutional text.58 Members of Congress also use the words “so help 
me God” in their oath of office.59 
 
 55. JAMES ENDELL TYLER, OATHS: THEIR ORIGIN, NATURE & HISTORY 14 (2d ed. 1935). 
For a statement of the same point as a matter of nineteenth century English law, see 1 S. MARCH 
PHILLIPS & THOMAS JAMES ARNOLD, LAW OF EVIDENCE 13 (1852). 
 56. Cf. Hebrews 6:16 (King James) (“An oath for confirmation [between mortals] is to them 
an end of all strife.”). Building on the power of the oath, God himself “confirmed” his counsel “unto 
the heirs of promise” of Abraham by an oath, “[t]hat by two immutable things [i.e., the promise and 
the oath], in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation . . . to lay 
hold upon the hope set before us.” Id. at 6:17–18. 
 57. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of 
Selected Nineteenth Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the 
United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927, 979–86 (1996). 
 58. See id. at 983–84; see also James E. Pfander, So Help Me God: Religion and Presidential 
Oath-Taking, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 549, 551 (1999); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the 
Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2110–11 (1996). 
 59. The Constitution requires members of Congress to take an oath, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 
3, but the words to be used are not set out verbatim. The text of the oath to be used by members of 
Congress and other federal officials is supplied by statute: 
An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in 
the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: “I, AB, do solemnly 
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The close connection between the oath and invocations of Deity has 
fueled a debate over the efficacy and propriety of mandatory oath-taking. 
That debate has often been framed in religious terms.60 
Critics such as Jeremy Bentham object that the oath implies that man 
is able to control the power of God by deciding when that power will be 
used.61 He also contended that if one expected divine retribution for 
swearing falsely, punishment for perjury was unnecessary. He suggested 
that the oath be abolished and that false statements “uttered upon a legal 
occasion, for a legal purpose” be punished “according to the nature of the 
mischief,”62 i.e., perjury should be punished as such, without the 
necessity of taking an oath.63 
 
swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the 
same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I 
am about to enter. So help me God. 
5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000) (setting out the oath of 
office for federal judges): 
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation 
before performing the duties of his office: “I, _______ _______, do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the 
poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all 
the duties incumbent upon me as _______ under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. So help me God.” 
(emphasis added). The words of § 453 are often used, apparently as a matter of tradition, when 
witnesses promise under oath to testify truthfully before a congressional committee. In fact, a 
member of a Senate committee recently criticized the committee chair for omitting the words “So 
help me God.” Senator Upset About So Help Me God Oath, IOWA CITY PRESS CITIZEN, Aug. 3, 
2001, at 5A. 
 60. The debate has, of course, been political as well, especially with respect to mandatory 
loyalty oaths. For discussions on the history of loyalty oaths in the United States, see HAROLD M. 
HYMAN, TO TRY MEN’S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1959); Vic Snyder, 
You’ve Taken an Oath to Support the Constitution, Now What? The Constitutional Requirement for 
a Congressional Oath of Office, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 897 (2001). 
 61. See Jeremy Bentham, “Swear Not At All”: Containing an Exposure of the Needlessness 
and Mischievousness, as Well as the Anti-Christianity, of the Ceremony of an Oath, in 5 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 187 (John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1817). 
 62. JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 366–367 (Rotham & Co., 
photo. reprint 1995) (1827). 
 63. John Stuart Mill, criticizing the rule requiring witnesses to take an oath, argued the 
following: 
The assumption on which this is grounded is that the oath is worthless of a person who 
does not believe in a future state—a proposition which betokens much ignorance of 
history in those who assent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of 
infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished integrity and honor), and would be 
maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in 
greatest repute with the world, both for virtues and attainments, are well known, at least 
AND-PP3 10/21/2003 10:16:30 AM 
nnn] Three Degrees of Promising 
 119 
Defenders argue that those taking an oath do not purport to control 
God but that they recognize God’s hand in human affairs.64 Both critics 
and defenders have noted that the oath in its traditional form has its 
greatest effect on those who believe in God. If one assumes that the oath-
taker is likely to be a believer, the oath protects those who might rely on 
it. As Justice Story put it with regard to the presidential oath: 
A President, who shall dare to violate the obligations of his solemn 
oath or affirmation of office, may escape human censure, nay may even 
receive applause from the giddy multitude. But he will be compelled to 
learn, that there is a watchful Providence, that cannot be deceived; and 
a righteous Being, the searcher of all hearts, who will render unto all 
men according to their deserts. Considerations of this sort will 
necessarily make a conscientious man more scrupulous in the discharge 
of his duty; and will even make a man of looser principles pause, when 
he is about to enter upon a deliberate violation of his official oath.65 
I sketch the debate over mandatory oath-taking simply to emphasize 
that, in its origin and (considering its ancient lineage) its fairly recent 
history, the oath is essentially religious. A genuinely religious person 
may be moved much less by the prospect of divine punishment for 
violating an oath than by the sense that an oath directly implicates the 
deepest elements of the self, which is understood only in the relationship 
of the self to God. 
That understanding of the oath is perhaps best reflected in the life of 
one who refuses to take an oath, even at great personal cost. Playwright 
Robert Bolt’s Sir Thomas More dramatically portrays such a person. The 
historical More in fact refused to take an oath in support of the Act of 
Succession because it entailed a repudiation of papal supremacy.66 In A 
Man for All Seasons, Bolt’s More, imprisoned for refusing to take the 
oath, is visited by his family. His daughter Margaret has herself already 
 
to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The rule, besides, is suicidal and cuts away its own 
foundation. Under pretense that atheists must be liars, it admits the testimony of all 
atheists who are willing to lie, and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of publicly 
confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 29 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978) (1859). 
 64. In his treatise on evidence, Simon Greenleaf made the point this way: “The design of the 
oath is not to call the attention of God to man; but the attention of man to God;—not to call on Him 
to punish the wrong-doer, but on man to remember that He will.” SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 364(a) (16th ed. 1899). 
 65. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
170 (1840). 
 66. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS vii–x, 159 (1960). 
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taken an oath to attempt to persuade More to yield: 
More: (Coldly) That was silly, Meg. How did you come to do that? 
Margaret: I wanted to! 
More: You want me to swear to the Act of Succession? 
Margaret: “God more regards the thoughts of the heart than the words 
of the mouth.” Or so you’ve always told me. 
More: Yes. 
Margaret: Then say the words of the oath and in your heart think 
otherwise. 
More: What is an oath but words we say to God? 
Margaret: That’s very neat. 
More: Do you mean it isn’t true? 
Margaret: No, it’s true. 
More: Then it’s a poor argument to call it “neat,” Meg. When a man 
takes an oath, Meg, he’s holding his own self in his own hands. Like 
water. (He cups his hands) And if he opens his fingers then—he 
needn’t hope to find himself again. Some men aren’t capable of this, 
but I’d be loathe to think your father one of them.67 
Sir Thomas More’s courage and integrity may impress us, and 
Justice Story’s comment may charm. But both may strike many modern 
minds as anachronistic. Modern society has omitted references to deity 
from some oaths.68 The sovereign state or its representative now stands 
in place of the sovereign God. The oath, however, retains the imprint of 
its religious character. No wonder George Washington’s addition of the 
 
 67. Id. at 139. 
 68. See supra note 52; see also 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 405 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (“The common-law rule requiring 
that a witness believe in a Divine Being who, in this life or hereafter, will punish false swearing is 
not applied in the federal courts. It has long since been rejected on the basis of ‘reason and 
experience.’”) (quoting Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1958)); see also 
Moore v. United States, 348 U.S. 966 (1955) (per curiam); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 
(4th Cir. 1969). 
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words “so help me God” to the constitutionally prescribed presidential 
oath has remained untouched and seems so natural. 
2. The religious character of marriage 
Marriage, the other example of second-degree promises discussed 
here, also has deep religious roots. In American culture, one who marries 
often recognizes the role of God in creating the union and sustaining it. 
The United States inherited a substantial amount of its marriage law from 
England, where marriage was for many years within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and the common law.69 Marriage 
has always been under the jurisdiction of the civil courts in this country, 
but the clergy have always been authorized to preside over the exchange 
of marriage vows, and often do so. When a priest or pastor acting as 
God’s servant officiates over a marriage ceremony, the entire ceremony 
becomes an essentially religious one. Of course, nonreligious weddings 
solemnized by civil officers are also common. But the connection 
between God and marriage is prominent in our national consciousness. 
For a substantial number of Americans, marriage is an essentially 
religious sacrament, ordinance, or observance—a form of third-degree 
promising.70 Although many people in this country have chosen, and 
continue to choose, to marry in strictly civil ceremonies, religious 
weddings remain common and, in some places, predominant.71 God is 
not merely a witness to or enforcer of the promise but an active 
participant with the husband and wife and the source of the blessings 
 
 69. CLARK, supra note 37, § 2.2, at 31. 
 70. It is true, of course, that marriage has been regarded as a secular institution in a number 
of cultures, such as ancient Rome before the establishment of Christianity. See H.F. JOLOWICZ & 
BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1972). 
 71. The relative numbers of religious and civil marriage ceremonies vary among the states. In 
Indiana, for example, 28.2% of marriage ceremonies were civil and 71.4% religious, with 0.4% 
unknown in 1995. See IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, INDIANA MARRIAGE REPORT, 
http://www.in.gov/isdh/dataandstats/marriage/1995/table3.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). For 
2000, the numbers were 31.1% and 68.6%, with 0.3% unknown. See IND. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, 
INDIANA MARRIAGE REPORT 2000, (2002) 
http://www.in.gov/isdh/dataandstats/marriage/2000/table3.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). In 
Minnesota, in 1996, 24.74% of couples opted to marry in civil ceremonies. MINN. CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS (Oct. 16, 2001) (on file with author). By 1999 the percentage of couples opting for civil 
ceremonies increased slightly to 26.72%. See MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, 1999 MINNESOTA HEALTH 
STATISTICS ANNUAL SUMMARY (2001), 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/chs/99annsum/index2.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). In 
Vermont, the percentage of civil ceremonies has been increasing gradually from 47.2% in 1990 to 
55.4% in 1997. VT. DEP’T OF HEALTH, MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES 
http://www.state.vt.us/health/vs97/mardiv.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). 
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marriage can bring. As described above, that is the belief in the LDS 
community.72 It is so in other religious traditions as well.73 That 
understanding of marriage is sufficiently pervasive that it remains an 
important part of modern culture, even though it is far from universally 
accepted. 
V. INSIGHTS FROM THE THREE DEGREES OF PROMISING 
The three degrees of promising reflect the tension between the 
competing “economic” and “eternal” sides of human nature. Each exerts 
an affirmative pull on individual behavior and understanding and on the 
broader culture, including the practice of promising. When both 
conceptions apply an approximately equal force, second-degree 
promising and the “moral” being appears. 
A. The Contest Between the Economic and the Eternal Being 
The self-interested economic being is dominant in first-degree 
promising. But that domination is not complete. Social conscience 
manifests itself in numerous ways, such as in the principles and doctrines 
of unconscionability, illegality, avoidance of forfeiture, and good faith. 
Although some of these doctrines can be clothed in economic dress, I 
believe they cannot be fully accounted for without reference to the 
 
 72. “Eternal marriage is a covenant, a sacred promise that a wife and a husband make with 
each other and with God.” James T. Duke, Eternal Marriage, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, 
supra note 43, at 858. 
 73. According to the Catholic Church, for example, “The consent by which the spouses 
mutually give and receive one another is sealed by God himself. From their covenant arises ‘an 
institution, confirmed by the divine law, . . . even in the eyes of society.’ The covenant between the 
spouses is integrated into God’s covenant with man.” CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 
1639, at 409 (1994). 
Although formal vows are not exchanged in the marriage rituals performed in the Orthodox 
Christian tradition, marriage is an important sacrament. It is understood that the “spouses promise 
reciprocal fidelity before the Church; the grace of God is bestowed through the blessing of the 
minister of the Church. It sanctifies their union and confers the dignity of representing the spiritual 
union of Christ and the Church.” PAUL EVDOKINOV, THE SACRAMENT OF LOVE 119 (1985) (quoting 
METROPOLITAN MARCARIUS, ORTHODOX DOGMATIC THEOLOGY (1883)). 
Protestant writers also emphasize the role of God in marriage. 
[I]t takes three to make a marriage: a man, a woman, and God. It is His presence that 
hallows it, offering whatever permanence it is to have. . . . [C]ovenant marriage is 
capable of bridging the depths of despair that wreck so many couples. It looks to a higher 
power far beyond the partner, making it possible for each to give to the other the love and 
understanding that is needed. 
JOHN CHARLES WYNN, PASTORAL MINISTRY TO FAMILIES 131–32 (1957). 
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influence of a higher conception of the individual. Thus, in first-degree 
promising we find evidence of an upward pull. 
Third-degree promising is the province of a being who, in LDS 
theology, is not only spiritual but eternal.74 Those who make promises 
explicitly on the basis of their relationship to Deity draw on that part of 
human nature that is least self-centered and most concerned with the 
well-being of others. But third-degree promisors are not immune to the 
influence of the economic being. They find it difficult to free themselves 
from material self-interest in understanding their covenants and in living 
up to what they understand. Nonetheless, such individuals strive to draw 
closer to God.75 
Second-degree promising is pulled simultaneously by, and in a sense 
suspended between, the economic and the eternal sides of our natures. It 
assumes the promisor is acting on more than economic self-interest. Yet 
it stops short of treating the promise as creating a direct relationship with 
God. The resulting compromise conceives of the promisor as a moral 
being, acting on personal and social, but not necessarily religious, 
principles. 
Poised between, and clearly influenced by, both the economic and 
the eternal being, the promises made by the moral being serve as a kind 
of cultural barometer. They show whether the pressure is rising toward 
the spiritual realm or falling toward the material realm, thus 
demonstrating the relative strength each enjoys in our culture. If third-
degree promising flourishes and society holds religious covenants in high 
esteem, the respect we give the oath and marriage vows will naturally be 
higher. By contrast, if the contracts of the commercial world are not only 
central to economic life, but are considered the template for all promises, 
second-degree promises are pulled closer to, and become more like, 
 
 74. Latter-day Saint theology considers men and women to be not only spiritual beings, but 
also eternal beings, with mortality being but one segment of an existence stretching timelessly in 
both directions. See Doctrine & Covenants 93:29 (“Man was also in the beginning with God. 
Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not created or made, neither indeed can be.”); see also 
Doctrine & Covenants 138:47–60. 
 75. Unfortunately, this description of third-degree promising as entirely edifying is 
incomplete, particularly in relation to oaths. There is a dark side to taking oaths as well. Latter-day 
Saint scriptures, particularly the Book of Mormon, make that point repeatedly, with accounts of 
those who used the oath for the purpose of working and concealing evil. See, e.g., Helaman 1:11, 2:3 
(Book of Mormon); Ether 8:9–18 (Book of Mormon). The “secret combinations” created by these 
oaths are described as “most abominable and wicked above all, in the sight of God.” Ether 8:18 
(Book of Mormon); see also Moses 5:29–30, 6:27–29 (Pearl of Great Price). An individual who 
becomes involved in the spiritual elements of life has a greater capacity for both good and evil. My 
purpose in this paper is to explore the potential of the oath for good. 
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those of the first degree. 
B. Marriage and Contract 
In fact, over the last decade marriage vows have become increasingly 
vulnerable to the influence of first-degree promises. Traditionally, 
marriages that were not third-degree promises rested comfortably in the 
second degree. American culture has viewed marriage as an exchange of 
basic, very general commitments based on the high principle of mutual 
caring and assistance: “for better or for worse, in sickness and in health.” 
Some agreements relating to marriage have long coexisted with, and do 
not threaten, an understanding that elevates marriage vows above first-
degree promising. Specifically, a contract controlling the disposition of 
their property upon the death of a spouse, particularly when one or both 
have children from a prior marriage, is ancillary to the obligations of the 
marriage itself and can bring stability and certainty to extended family 
relationships.76 
The relationship of contract to marriage changes when the spouses 
(usually as prospective spouses) enter an agreement governing their 
financial affairs in the event of a divorce. For many years, the courts 
declined to enforce such contracts on the ground that they were 
conducive to divorce and were therefore contrary to public policy.77 A 
more accurate statement of the objection might be that they were 
conducive to marriage—marriages reflecting lack of full commitment to 
the union. 
Over time, as the rate of divorce rose steadily, the policy against 
agreements in contemplation of divorce eroded substantially. Courts 
interpreted public policy as much more tolerant of divorce and therefore 
 
 76. For instance, in Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), the court stated: 
Antenuptial or so-called ‘marriage settlement’ contracts by which the parties agree upon 
and fix the property rights which either spouse will have in the estate of the other upon 
his or her death have . . . long been recognized as being conducive to marital tranquility 
and thus in harmony with public policy. 
Id. at 383. 
 77. A 1964 court, for instance, held: 
It may be stated as a general rule that any antenuptial contract which provides for, 
facilitates, or tends to induce, a separation or divorce of the parties after marriage, is 
contrary to public policy, and is therefore void. It has often been held that an antenuptial 
agreement limiting the liability of the husband to the wife for alimony, or fixing the 
property rights of the parties, in the event of a separation or divorce, is void. 
Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (quoting 17 AM. JUR. Divorce and 
Separation § 16, at 267 (1938)). 
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not opposed to premarital agreements designed to facilitate the 
dissolution of marriage. For example, some courts have suggested that 
planning for divorce in advance of marriage may bring stability to the 
union.78 Although one occasionally still encounters cases in which courts 
refuse to enforce premarital agreements creating a strong financial 
incentive to divorce on grounds of public policy,79 the notion that 
premarital agreements are inherently suspect is scarcely visible in 
modern case law.80 
The courts and legislatures have, at least nominally, imposed 
safeguards, making the formation of such contracts subject to standards 
of procedural or substantive fairness greater than those applicable to 
ordinary commercial contracts.81 In the typical case, one potential 
spouse, usually a man with relatively great economic power, presents the 
woman, on the eve of their wedding, with a proposed, one-sided financial 
agreement that will govern in the event of a divorce and, expressly or 
impliedly, conditions his assent to the marriage on her assent to the 
contract. The momentum for the wedding is well underway. The event 
cannot be postponed without public embarrassment. In those stressful 
 
 78. The court stated in Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982): 
Although the state has an interest in marriage and in preserving family relationships, the 
public policy of this state has altered dramatically in regard to marriage and divorce. . . . 
[D]issolution may [now] be obtained with relative ease. We cannot say that public 
policy . . . is eroded by agreements which anticipate and provide for the economic 
arrangements upon dissolution of a marriage. On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe 
that such planning brings a greater stability to the marriage relation by protecting the 
financial expectations of the parties, and does not necessarily encourage or contribute to 
dissolution. . . . Thus, we reject the contention urged by the wife that such agreements 
violate public policy and are void ab initio in Colorado. 
Id. at 731–32 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 79. See, e.g., Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264, 1269 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to 
enforce premarital agreement under which wife was to receive half of husband’s considerable 
holdings of company shares in the event he initiated divorce proceedings, then promptly after 
marriage went on a spending spree with husband’s money; “a promise in a prenuptial agreement 
regarding the disposition, upon divorce, of property brought to the marriage by the parties is 
unenforceable if it tends unreasonably to encourage divorce or separation”); Dajani v. Dajani, 251 
Cal. Rptr. 871, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to enforce Jordanian marriage contract under 
which wife would receive payment of dowry upon divorce, since it “clearly provided for wife to 
profit by a divorce”). 
 80. Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2001) (“Premarital agreements now appear to be 
enforceable, at least in some circumstances, in all American jurisdictions.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 732–36 (Colo. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. 
ch. 596. The “Principles of Family Dissolution” recently adopted by the American Law Institute 
proposes a number of procedural requirements for the enforcement of premarital agreements. Bix, 
supra note 80, at 236–40. 
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circumstances, she signs the agreement. Some years later the marriage 
comes to an end, and she attempts to avoid enforcement of the 
agreement.82 As premarital agreements have become increasingly 
common, the standards governing them in some jurisdictions vary little 
from those that control contracts in the world of commerce.83 
Such agreements typically focus exclusively on financial 
arrangements upon the dissolution of a marriage. The door is now open 
to an additional step in “contractualizing” marriage: agreements that 
focus on noneconomic matters in an ongoing, legally intact marriage. 
Contracts of that type are apparently not yet widespread in practice, but 
their legislative foundation already exists. The Uniform Premarital 
Agreements Act (“UPAA”), adopted with modifications in twenty-six 
jurisdictions,84 appears to authorize agreements of that sort. After 
specifying various kinds of terms premarital agreements may contain, 
with an emphasis on economic matters, the UPAA provides that the 
parties “may contract with respect to . . . [a]ny other matter, including 
their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or 
statute imposing a criminal penalty.”85 
Apparently few people have sought to make detailed, enforceable 
bargains over the “personal rights and obligations” of married life, so the 
extent to which “public policy” might limit such arrangements has not 
been determined.86 But the influential Conference of Commissioners on 
 
 82. See, e.g., DeLorean v. DeLorean, 511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986). 
 83. See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (“Prenuptial agreements are 
contracts, and, as such, should be evaluated under the same criteria as are applicable to other types of 
contracts.”). 
 84. The following jurisdictions have adopted the UPAA: Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B 
U.L.A. 369 (West 1987 & Supp. 2001). 
 85. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(8), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001).  See AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 7.01-
.12, at 945 (2002), for a recent attempt to articulate standards governing premarital agreements. 
Agreements between unmarried cohabitants have become common in the last few decades. Some 
courts, at least initially, refused to enforce them on the ground that doing so would make nonmarital 
cohabitation an attractive alternative to marriage. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 
(Ill. 1979). A number of other courts, including the California Supreme Court in its famous decision 
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), have rejected that argument. See also Cook v. Cook, 
691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987); Watts v. Watts, 
405 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Wis. 1987). The common use of agreements in nonmarital cohabitation 
strengthens the sense that families are the creation of bargaining very similar to first-degree 
promising. 
 86. The courts have not been sympathetic to the occasional pre-UPAA case in which the 
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Uniform State Laws’ promotion of the basis for such bargains in the 
UPAA is evidence that the idea of thinking in contractual terms about the 
meaning of marriage has left the realm of mere academic speculation.87 
Whether contracts governing the personal or intimate elements of 
married life become commonplace remains to be seen.88 
I do not mean, by this sketch of the developments in the law of 
marital contracts, to argue for a refusal to enforce all such agreements. 
Indeed, I believe there is an important role for many of them. Rather, I 
seek only to suggest that a powerful social acceptance of first-degree 
promising as a primary cultural norm has the potential to draw the law of 
marriage into its wake.89 
That tendency probably is not only, or even primarily, reflected in 
attempts to make formal contracts about marriage and to enforce them in 
court. Its greater impact may be in an attitude that views marriage and 
other family relationships in a contractual way, even if informally or 
 
parties have purported to regulate the nonfinancial elements of marital life through contract. See, 
e.g., Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing, in divorce action, to consider 
alleged breach of premarital agreement concerning physical intimacy), rev’d on other grounds, 339 
So. 2d 843 (La. 1976). I have found no decided cases dealing with the scope of UPAA § 3(8). See 
generally Difonzo, supra note 42; Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement 
Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the 
Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037 (1993). 
 87. For a discussion on contracts within marriage and contracts in lieu of marriage, see 
Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 
(1974). See also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS AND THE 
LAW (1981). 
 88. The recent adoption of “covenant marriage” in a few jurisdictions may represent a 
reaction to this trend. So far, three states have adopted covenant marriage laws, and legislators have 
introduced covenant marriage bills in several other states. For current covenant marriage laws, see 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-801 to 9-11-811 (Michie 
2002); and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272–:275 (West 2000). For thoughtful discussions of covenant 
marriage, see MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 29–34 (2000); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven Nock, Covenant and 
Contract, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 9 (2000). It is unclear whether covenant marriage will have a 
significant impact. 
 89. I have not explored here whether a similar movement exists in relation to the oath. One 
might start by asking whether the oath is coming to be seen primarily as a vehicle for advancing self-
interest rather than the good of the community. Is it becoming common for persons making promises 
under oath to consider themselves entitled to recalculate the oath’s advantage to them as 
circumstances change? Do they excuse breaking their promises because of others’ bad behavior or 
for other reasons that justify nonperformance of a contract? Might one find such a pattern in the 
ultimate lack of public censure for President Clinton’s willingness to make false statements under 
oath? See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1127 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (“[T]he record demonstrates 
by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiff’s [deposition] questions 
by giving false, misleading and evasive answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial 
process.”). 
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subconsciously. Such thinking is grounded in the view that exalts self-
interest over the good of the family, not merely as a result of periodic 
and inevitable moral weakness but as a settled personal philosophy. A 
marriage viewed primarily as a vehicle for self-fulfillment rather than as 
a commitment to the good of the family is a marriage based on first-
degree promising.90 
Direct empirical evidence of that attitude is necessarily elusive. But 
the explosion of divorce in recent decades and other forms of family 
dissolution certainly point in that direction. Jennifer Roback Morse has 
explored that phenomenon.91 “A family held together by a series of 
contractual understandings,” she says, “even the most reasonable and 
elaborate, turns out to be less stable than a family held together by that 
vague, much misunderstood, intangible quality called love.”92 I assume 
her religious commitment to Catholicism,93 which considers marriage 
vows as third-degree promises, makes evident to her the risks of viewing 
marriage as nothing more than a collection of first-degree promises. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The three degrees of promising have coexisted for a long time. Each 
responds to particular needs in our culture: First-degree promising is 
essential to the effective functioning of the commercial world. Second-
degree promising fosters the making of commitments essential to civic 
institutions and responsibilities in a pluralistic society. Third-degree 
promising gives those who believe in God the possibility of eternal 
promises. For Latter-day Saints, in particular, those promises provide a 
basis for hope in the continuation after death of our most important 
relationships. That hope is not simply a metaphorical prop to encourage 
the faithful in fulfilling their duties or keeping their marriages strong. It 
is the assurance of a literal, eternal union with our loved ones in the 
presence of God. 
 
 90. For an extensive critique of the movement toward “privatizing” family law, see Jana B. 
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443. Professor Singer’s examination 
includes, but extends well beyond, the specific marriage contract issues discussed here. She 
expresses concerns about the private ordering of marriage but on bases quite different from those 
discussed in this paper. For a contrasting argument that family law should be expressly assimilated 
to the law of business associations, see Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the 
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001). 
 91. JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, LOVE & ECONOMICS: WHY THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE FAMILY 
DOESN’T WORK (2001). 
 92. Id. at 3. 
 93. See id. at 214–20. 
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Although they appropriately fill different and important functions, 
these three degrees of promising are connected with each other. The 
emphasis each receives in our individual lives, in our communities, and 
in the broader culture affects the others. That emphasis needs to be kept 
in proper balance. 
Suppose third-degree promising were treated not just as a privilege 
and opportunity for those exercising their faith in God but as mandatory 
in commercial matters. The result would be a serious imposition on those 
who do not share the believer’s faith. Even if practiced within a 
community of believers, such a mandate might devalue third-degree 
promising itself to the extent that promisors were not spiritually prepared 
to make their commercial arrangements a matter of religious covenant. 
Although acting with honesty and integrity in all affairs, including 
commercial transactions, is expected of Latter-day Saints, the history of 
their church teaches the perils of undertaking daily, communal 
obligations on a third-degree basis before a community is prepared to do 
so.94 
But the reverse problem is also possible. First-degree promising can 
become so predominant that it sets the pattern for all our promissory 
relationships with others. In particular, as third-degree promising loses 
respect in modern society, it also loses its capacity to act as a 
counterbalance to first-degree promising. The economic being drives the 
eternal being from the stage as we increasingly evaluate our 
commitments and obligations, including those of the vital second degree, 
through the cold eye of self-interest. I suggest that we are now 
witnessing that phenomenon, to some degree, in our culture generally as 
 
 94. During the early 1830s, members of the LDS Church began to settle in Jackson County, 
Missouri. They were expected to live the “law of consecration,” a communitarian order under which 
individuals placed all their possession in a common treasury; received back an “inheritance” from 
which to earn a living through farming, business, etc.; and voluntarily returned to the treasury at the 
end of each year any surplus earnings beyond personal and family needs. Frank W. Hirschi, Law of 
Consecration, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, supra note 43, at 313. Within a few years, mob 
violence forced the Mormons from the area. Their own failure to live the law of consecration was 
cited as an underlying cause of their distress in a revelation received by the LDS prophet Joseph 
Smith: 
[T]hey have not learned to be obedient to the things which I required at their hands, but 
are full of all manner of evil, and do not impart of their substance, as becometh saints, to 
the poor and afflicted among them; [a]nd are not united according to the union required 
by the law of the celestial kingdom [the third “degree of glory” in LDS theology]; [a]nd 
Zion cannot be built up unless it is by the principles of the law of the celestial kingdom; 
otherwise I cannot receive her unto myself. 
Doctrine & Covenants 105:3–5; see B.H. ROBERTS, THE MISSOURI PERSECUTIONS 60–61 (1900). 
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evidenced by the tendency to contractualize marriage, whether formally 
or informally. 
Third-degree promising is important beyond the content of the 
specific covenants that Latter-day Saints and other believers make with 
God. The very existence of third-degree promising—if taken seriously—
pulls in opposition to first-degree promising. A belief in the reality of our 
eternal nature competes with the tendency toward materialism and self-
promotion. Serious third-degree promising shows that the assumptions 
that underlie second-degree promising are at the midpoint, not the 
endpoint, of a spectrum. One need not (in my view, should not) think that 
all promises should be eternal. But knowing that some promises are 
eternal emphasizes that not all promises are temporal and economic. 
People who share a belief in the eternal and the divine—even when their 
beliefs diverge on important matters of religious principle—find a 
heightened, mutual basis for their most important social promises. They 
share assumptions at least about second-degree promising that can edify 
and enrich law and social policy. 
I conclude with an illustration of the influence that a promise under 
oath can have in modern life when one does not recalculate the costs and 
benefits to self of keeping the promise as challenges arise, but treats the 
commitment as something higher than a first-degree promise. New York 
Fire Battalion Chief John Moran died in the collapse of the World Trade 
Center. Not long before the September 11, 2001 disaster, he spoke to a 
reporter in connection with a fire he had fought on Fathers Day—a fire 
that killed three men. I do not know if he considered his oath to be a 
religious commitment or merely a high civic duty. But his statement 
reveals the power of the oath both in his own life and, through him, in 
the lives of others: “The firefighter performs one act of bravery in his 
career, and that’s when he takes the oath of office. After that, everything 
else is in the line of duty.”95 
 
 
 95. CNN Saturday Morning News: Firefighters Cope With Tragic Losses (CNN television 
broadcast Sept. 15, 2001 (quoting Moran, Statement to Dateline NBC)). 
